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Uber Retirement
Paul M. Secunda†

INTRODUCTION
Although by no means a new question regarding retirement, the
noteworthy growth of “gig companies”1 in the “sharing economy,”2 has
renewed concerns that even more American workers will lack access to
employment-based retirement plans.3 The gig economy, however, does
“offer[] workers advantages including more independence and
flexibility, . . . company-sponsored retirement saving is not one of
them.”4 This is a “dangerous” state of affairs as employment-based

†
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1
Gig companies have been “defined as relying on the internet to match buyers and sellers of
services.” Robert J. Samuelson, Is the Gig Economy the Labor Market’s New Reality? Nope, WASH.
POST (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/sdut-gig-econ
omy-robert-samuelson-2016sep02-story.html [https://perma.cc/L4SM-HWAS]; see also Shu-Yi Oei
& Diane Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence from Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM.
J. TAX L. 56 (2017) (discussing “meteoric rise of Uber Technologies, Inc.,” a ride-sharing company,
including the fact that it has more than 160,000 drivers who have received $656.8 million in
payments from Uber in the last three months of 2014, and that Uber has provided one billion rides
worldwide as of the end of 2015).
2
The sharing economy refers to a “new model of production and consumption of goods
and services often referred to as ‘sharing.’” Oei & Ring, supra note 1. Other terms for “sharing
economy” include: “‘the disaggregated economy,’ ‘the peer-to-peer economy’ (P-2-P), ‘the humanto-human economy’ (H-2-H), ‘the community marketplace,’ ‘the on-demand economy,’ ‘the App
economy,’ ‘the access economy,’ ‘the mesh economy,’ ‘the gig economy,’ and also, ‘the Uberization
of everything.’” See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 89 (2016).
3
Sixty-six percent of 114 million private-sector workers have access to a retirement plan
through work. Therefore, 34% of 114 million private-sector workers (39 million) do not have access
to a retirement plan through work. See US DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES — MARCH 2016 (2016), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
ebs2.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL4E-CPGJ].
4
See Mark Henricks, Retirement Plans for the Gig Economy, MAIN ST. (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.mainstreet.com/article/retirement-plans-for-the-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/3G3M
-GM3Y].
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retirement plans make up a critical part of an individual’s strategy for
retirement security.5
Such retirement plans, like the nearly-ubiquitous 401(k) plans,6
provide a necessary bulwark against destitution in old age. This is
especially so given that Social Security provides only partial income
replacement,7 and that few Americans have put away much in private
savings.8 Yet independent contractors, which are how most gig
companies classify their workers,9 are approximately two-thirds less
likely than standard employees to have access to an employer-provided
retirement plan.10 Much academic and judicial ink has already been
spilt over whether Uber drivers and other members of the sharing
economy are independent contractors or employees.11 This classification
is of utmost importance because it largely determines whether gig
workers are covered by employment laws, as most such laws center on
the employer-employee relationship.12
Surveys have indicated that a significant number of gig workers
want—and need—to have employer-based retirement plans.13 Into the
5

See Paul M. Secunda & Brendan S. Maher, Pension De-Risking, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 733,
734 (2016) (“Retirement planning is not only difficult, but also dangerous. It is dangerous for
individuals because poor planning can mean post-employment penury.”).
6
401(k) plans are defined contribution (DC) pension plans in which employees may defer a
percentage of their salary into a tax-preferred individual account held in trust. See id. at 735.
7
See Mark Miller, How to Improve Your Retirement Income if You Haven’t Saved, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/your-money/retirement-savings-income-socialsecurity.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/S8VN
-EQMY].
8
See Matthew Frankel, Here’s the Average American’s Savings Rate, MOTLEY FOOL (Oct. 3,
2016), http://www.fool.com/investing/2016/10/03/heres-the-average-americans-savings-rate.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2WLB-A5NZ] (“According to the latest data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, the personal saving rate in the United States is 5.7% . . . This is far too low to adequately
prepare most people for retirement and unexpected expenses . . . Most experts recommend saving
at least 10% to 15% of your income.”).
9
See Veena Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker
Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 101, 103 (2017).
10
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS,
EARNINGS, AND BENEFITS 6 (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669766.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T4HE-A35R].
11
For a sampling of recent cases regarding gig worker classification issues, see Cotter v. Lyft,
Inc., 176 F.Supp.3d 930 (N.D. Cal. 2016); O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 311 F.R.D. 547
(N.D. Cal. 2013); Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *1-8
(Cal. Dept. Lab. June 3, 2015), aff ’d No. CGC-15-546378 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 16, 2015). For a
sampling of academic scholarship on the employee/independent contractor debate over the years,
see generally Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1511, 1513 (2016) (citing various articles taking different approaches).
12
Means & Seiner, supra note 11, 1513–14 (“Employees cost more than independent
contractors because businesses are responsible for . . . payroll taxes, workers’ compensation
insurance, health care, minimum wage, overtime, and the reimbursement of business-related
expenses.”).
13
See WILLIAM G. GALE, SARAH E. HOLMES & DAVID C. JOHN, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
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breach, a number of proposals have emerged to provide “independent
workers” or “independent contractors,” who work for gig companies,
with some form of portable, occupational retirement benefit.14 These
proposals are certainly praiseworthy for recognizing a substantial
problem: the need to provide gig workers with portable retirement
security given the sporadic, non-exclusive, frequently part-time nature
of most of this work.15 However, most of the extant proposals concede a
critical point by concluding that gig workers are not employees but
rather some type of independent contractor, for purposes of employment
law.16
Although a number of other papers have considered the
consequences of gig work on labor and employment laws,17 this is the
first article to establish why it is essential that individuals who work in
the sharing economy be considered common law employees for
retirement purposes. By being common law employees, these workers
qualify for consumer protections under the Darden test of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).18 Not only would gig
workers thereby qualify for fiduciary, disclosure, vesting, and other
important ERISA-specific protections, but ERISA also provides an ideal
pension structure that works well with the itinerant, sporadic, nonexclusive nature of gig work.19

RETIREMENT PLANS FOR CONTINGENT WORKERS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 8 (Sept. 23, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/rsp923paper1.pdf [https://perma.cc/W374
-VSED] (“[R]ecent survey indicated that 31 percent of the users of a specific software product said
that their main concern as an independent worker was a lack of employer-sponsored benefits.”).
14
See, e.g., SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR
MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 2
(Dec. 2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first
_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD4V-YTD4].
15
See NATALIE FOSTER, GREG NELSON & LIBBY REDER, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, PORTABLE
BENEFITS RESOURCE GUIDE 7 (2016), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2016/07/
resource_guide_final8-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJT8-WGYS] (describing on-demand economy
participation as sporadic, a source of secondary income, and sometime involving more than one
company).
16
See GALE ET AL., supra note 13, at 9–22 (surveying various non-ERISA approaches to
providing portable retirement benefits to gig workers).
17
See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 2; Means & Seiner, supra note 11; Dubal, supra note 11; BRISHEN
ROGERS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, REDEFINING EMPLOYMENT FOR THE MODERN
ECONOMY 1 (Oct. 2016), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Redefining_Employment_for_
the_Modern_Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKS5-ZHY8].
18
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1191 (2012); see Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323
(1992) (finding that common law “control test” applies to ERISA employee definition).
19
To be clear, a gig worker would have to be a common law employee to qualify for coverage
under ERISA. This is critical because only ERISA provides for the MEP pension structure.
However, open MEPs are not currently allowed under the current statutory and regulatory
structure and legislation has been introduced in Congress (or will be re-introduced) to allow them.
See generally infra Part III.A, B & C.
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More specifically, open multiple employer plans (Open MEPs)
allow unaffiliated employers to pool their resources and offer retirement
plans to their employees under the statutory protections of ERISA.20 By
designating a professional service provider to administer an Open MEP
for their employees, gig companies can largely limit fiduciary liability;
their only fiduciary actions would be the selection and subsequent
monitoring of the Open MEP sponsor.21
If large gig companies, like Uber, Lyft, Handy, or TaskRabbit, were
to join the same Open MEP, then their employees could easily move
between these employers. This dynamic would be beneficial for
employees who must work part-time and who sometimes work for two
or more of the platform companies simultaneously.22 With the Open
MEP model, these gig employees can pocket retirement contributions
all in one individual retirement account. Not only will stiffening market
competition from gig companies like Juno, who are willing to treat their
workers voluntarily as employees, increasingly cause more traditional
gig companies to change their employment models,23 but tax incentives
based on number of employees participating will make it worthwhile for
gig companies to voluntarily join such plans for their employees.24
Additional retirement plan participation can be ensured for employees
by placing them into plans automatically under automatic enrollment
provisions.25 Employees not wishing to participate in the retirement
plans could simply opt-out if they choose to do so, though experience
with opt-out provisions in current retirement plans indicates that most
will not.26
20

See generally U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL, OUTSOURCING EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PLAN SERVICES 18–22 (2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2014ACreport3.pdf [https://
perma.cc/87UW-H5SP] [hereinafter OUTSOURCING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN SERVICES].
21
Id. at 19 (“Effectively, the participating employer has outsourced the provision of retirement
benefits.”).
22
Open MEPs should be attractive to employers given market forces and tax incentives. See
infra Part III.B.
23
See Aarti Shahani, Uber Competitor in NYC Promises Drivers Benefits, Even Employee
Status, NPR (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/08/22/490655
700/uber-competitor-in-nyc-promises-drivers-benefits-even-employee-status [https://perma.cc/2L
74-FS8S].
24
See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215 (2004) (“ERISA represents a ‘careful
balancing’ between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the
encouragement of the creation of such plans.”).
25
See Robert Steyer, Auto-escalation Use in 401(k) Plans Too Low, Northern Trust Reports
Find, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENT (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.pionline.com/article/20160919/ON
LINE/160919841/auto-escalation-use-in-401k-plans-too-low-northern-trust-report-finds?newslett
er=daily&issue=20160919 [https://perma.cc/366N-CC9N] (currently about fifty-two percent of
private sector plans have auto-enrollment features).
26
See Paul M. Secunda, The Behavioral Economic Case for Paternalistic Workplace Pensions,
91 IND. L. REV. 505, 526 (2016) (“Overcoming the force of inertia, these opt out plans immediately
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This article sets out a model for providing retirement benefits for
gig workers in the sharing economy in three parts. Part I surveys
current efforts to provide portable benefits for gig workers and
discusses their various shortcomings, including the concession of lack
of employee status and consequent loss of ERISA protections. Part II
argues that many gig workers, though certainly not all, are common law
employees under the control test that applies under ERISA. Having
established employee status, Part III explores the advantage of ERISA
coverage for both employer and employees, including the flexibility of
the Open MEP retirement plan structure for gig companies to provide
their employees with retirement plan benefits.
I.

SAMPLING OF CURRENT EFFORTS TO PROVIDE PORTABLE
RETIREMENT BENEFITS TO GIG WORKERS

Although there has long been a need for cohesive retirement plan
policy to address the retirement crisis in the United States,27 the
development of the gig marketplace has accelerated the demand for
workable retirement programs for itinerant workers. As it is, members
of the so-called “contingent” workforce or “precariat” (part-time, leased,
temporary, and per diem workers) do not normally receive retirement
benefits as part of their employment.28 The problem among these
workers with the lack of access to retirement benefits has now been
exacerbated by the growth and development of the gig economy.29
What all these jobs have in common is that the work activity is
happening outside of the traditional “safety net” of employment and is
highly unstable.30 Whereas statutory “employees” are covered in the
United States by numerous labor and employment law statutes that
provide security and protection in the workplace, workers in these

led to much higher participation rates where plans were offered. Whereas 50% of employees had
participated in the opt in method, now 85% or more participate under the opt out method.”).
27
See Secunda, supra note 26, at 506–07 (“The American retirement security system hangs
treacherously on a precipice . . . All in all, too many Americans are saving too little for
retirement.”).
28
See Dubal, supra note 9, at 103 (noting that “[s]ocial scientists refer to the growth of the
casual workforce as the rise in the precariat—a class of workers whose relationship to employment
is precarious or risky because it lacks stability and the benefits or regulation”) (citing Arne L.
Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Work: Employment Relations in Transition, 74 AMER.
SOCIOL. REV. 1 (2009); GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (2011)).
29
See GALE ET AL., supra note 13, at 7 (“Based on the limited data available, it appears that
contingent workers are generally unprepared for retirement.”).
30
Id.; see also Noam Scheiber, Uber Drivers and Others in Gig Economy Take a Stand, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/business/uber-drivers-and-others-in-the
-gig-economy-take-a-stand.html [https://perma.cc/3Y2M-QHEY].
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alternative work arrangements are not.31 Formerly, “stable”
employment relationships have given way to relationships that are
much more “arms-length,”32 regardless of whether it is a contractor
situation, temporary employment, or a one-time encounter.33
To give an overview of what has been done to address the problems
facing this part of the contingent workforce concerning the lack of
retirement benefits for members, including the increasing number of
gig workers, Part I is divided into three sub-parts: (1) national-level
efforts to solve these retirement access issues for contingent workers,
(2) state- and municipal-level efforts, and (3) private-sector efforts. As
will be demonstrated, all these proposals, even though they increase
access, fail a basic requirement for adequate retirement security—
fiduciary consumer protections for enrolled workers—because none of
them provide for “employee” status under ERISA.
A.

National-Level “Solutions”
1.

Lessons from the Affordable Care Act

One national solution is potentially to model a legislative scheme
after the Affordable Care Act (ACA).34 In the seven years since Congress
enacted the ACA, the numbers of Americans without health insurance
has dropped precipitously.35 The ACA uses subsidized federal and state
Health Marketplaces, along with the expansion of Medicaid, to account
for these gains.36 All individuals must have access to affordable,
minimum essential coverage under the ACA, or pay a tax penalty.37
31

See Rogers, supra note 17, at 1 (observing that misclassification, subcontracting and
franchising all “tend to deprive workers of their rights under employment laws, which generally
do not protect independent contractors and do not effectively protect many subcontracted workers
or workers for franchisees”).
32
Aspen Institute, The Honorable Phyllis C. Borzi (Assistant Secretary for the Employee
Benefits Security Administration, U.S. Dept. Labor), Retirement Security in the On-Demand Economy, YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2016), https://youtu.be/MySsCe9G6yI [https://perma.cc/J5QL-VA36].
33
Id.
34
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111152, 124 Stat. 1029.
35
Key Facts about the Uninsured Population, THE HENRY KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Sept.
29, 2016), http://kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population [https://
perma.cc/JB4C-2943] (showing uninsured populations peaked at 18.2% of population in 2010 and
demonstrating uninsured population has dropped to 10.5% in 2016 or by 7.7%).
36
Id. (“Coverage gains were seen in new ACA coverage options. As of March 2016, over 11
million people were enrolled in state or federal Marketplace plans, and as of June 2016, Medicaid
enrollment had grown by over 15 million (27%) since the period before open enrollment (which
started in October 2013).”).
37
See Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (“[T]he individual
mandate . . . requires individuals to purchase a health insurance policy providing a minimum level
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Health insurance can be obtained through public programs (if eligible),
through one’s employer (if offered), or through individual policies
offered on an Exchange or through the private market.38 Individuals in
certain income brackets are eligible for premium assistance tax credits
if their employers do not provide the requisite coverage.39
So, perhaps not surprisingly, it has been proposed that retirement
coverage be offered in the same way as health coverage has been under
the ACA.40 An expanded Social Security could play the role of Medicaid
for low income workers, employers could still offer retirement plans, but
employees who lack access could purchase retirement plans on a
“federal backstop plan.”41 The advantage is, especially for gig workers,
that under such a plan, workers would have access to a retirement plan
without having to be connected to an employer for a specific period or
duration.42
The disadvantages, unfortunately, of such an ACA-based
retirement marketplace are fairly straightforward. The biggest
problems are that it does not necessarily require workers to receive
retirement benefits through their employer and therefore, such workers
would not be “employees,” entitled to the consumer protections of
ERISA.43 Additionally, given the unpopularity of such Exchange
programs in the current political environment, there is little reason to
believe that such ideas will gain much traction at the federal level.
2.

myRA

The Obama administration recently developed myRA, a program
meant to help shrink the retirement gap by providing access to
retirement plans for workers in the United States who currently do not
have such access.44 Deposits to myRA accounts by individuals are not

of coverage.”).
38
See COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 373 (4th ed. 2015).
39
Id. at 375.
40
See Amy B. Monahan, An Affordable Care Act for Retirement Plans, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 459,
472 (2014).
41
Id. at 478.
42
Id. at 472.
43
Conceivably, a pension-based ACA proposal could include or require similar fiduciary
consumer protections as ERISA does, but it is telling that the ACA itself chose not to include such
protections for non-employees.
44
See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MYRA, https://myra.gov/?utm_expid=112154954-9.nz5h8ogB
QpaO0c770moe0g.0 [https://perma.cc/HDL8-F7DM]. MyRA was discontinued by the Trump
administration in 2017. See Tara Siegel Bernard, Treasury Ends Obama-Era Retirement Savings
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/business/treasury-retire
ment-myra-obama.html?mcubz=3&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PFD2-V5JF].
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tax-deductible but instead grow tax-deferred and come out tax-free
upon retirement.45 All workers can invest, including those who want to
supplement an existing 401(k) plan, as long as their household income
falls below $191,000 per year.46 Another advantage of myRA accounts
are their portability, so that they move with the worker and are not
connected to any particular job or jobs in which an individual is
employed.47
Unfortunately, the program is not well-funded through
government subsidies with regard to the income tax foregone in the
form of tax-deferred contributions, so its near-universality as far as
eligibility means that there is a lifetime contribution cap of $15,000.48
Once the $15,000 cap is met, employees have the option to roll over their
myRA savings into a private-sector Roth Individual Retirement
Account (IRA),49 likely to be managed by a private investment
company.50
Moreover, employers do not match employee contributions and
there are no tax subsidies in place to incentivize lower income people to
contribute.51 Finally, unlike a Roth IRA, rather than having individuals
choose from a variety of investments available in the marketplace,52
myRA establishes a fund that invests in a government-managed
program guaranteed by taxpayers.53 Also, unlike Roth IRAs, accounts
will solely invest in government savings bonds, limiting risk, but also
limiting the growth potential of such retirement contributions.54

45

See How it Works, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MYRA, https://myra.gov/how-it-works/ [https://
perma.cc/GTE2-8XAD].
46
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MYRA: A SIMPLE, SAFE, AFFORDABLE RETIREMENT SAVINGS
ACCOUNT, https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/FINAL%20myRA%20Fact%20Sheet
.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXQ3-MKZU] (“MyRAs will be Roth IRA accounts available to anyone who
has an annual income of less than $129,000 a year (for individuals and $191,000 for couples.” [sic]).
47
See id. (“Portable – not tied to a single employer.”).
48
GALE ET AL., supra note 13, at 13 (“MyRA users can save up to $15,000 in those accounts;
once they hit the $15,000 threshold, they have the option to roll their savings over into a private
sector Roth IRA and continue saving.”).
49
See Matthew Malone, What is a Roth IRA?, ROTHIRA.COM, http://www.rothira.com/whatis-a-roth-ira [https://perma.cc/BXE8-MTUN] (“A Roth IRA is a special retirement account where
you pay taxes on money going into your account and then all future withdrawals are tax free.”).
50
Id.
51
Employers, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MYRA, https://myra.gov/employers/ [https://perma.cc/
9QL9-TS2P] (“[Employers] don’t administer employee accounts, contribute to them, or match
employee contributions.”).
52
See Kevin McCormally, Why You Need a Roth IRA, KIPLINGER, http://www.kiplinger.com/
article/retirement/T046-C006-S001-why-you-need-a-roth-ira.html [https://perma.cc/R45K-ASE6]
(“You can invest your Roth IRA in almost anything—stocks, bonds, mutual funds, CDs or even real
estate.”).
53
See How it Works, supra note 45.
54
See id. (“Your account will safely earn interest at 2.375% APR during the month of
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So as one commentator has observed, the program is “not so much
a retirement vehicle, but a way for households to have a little bit of
rainy day funds.”55 Also, given the long-term horizon of most retirement
plan investing, the short-term, low-risk nature of government saving
bonds is ill-suited for the need to generate investment returns on such
contributions over a long period.56 Needless to say, myRA does not come
close to providing the type of adequate retirement security most gig
workers are going to need.
B.

State and Municipal-Level “Solutions”
1.

Automatic-IRA Retirement Saving Plans

After more than twenty states started to develop automatic-IRA
retirement savings plans for workers without access to retirement plans
through their employers, the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Employee
Benefit Security Administration (EBSA) stepped in to make sure that
such plans would not be considered preempted by ERISA.57 In its final
regulations, Savings Arrangements Established by States for NonGovernmental Employees, the EBSA “describes circumstances in which
state payroll deduction savings programs with automatic enrollment
would not give rise to the establishment of employee pension benefit
plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as
amended (ERISA).”58
With more than 39 million workers in the United States without
access to occupational retirement plans and with the federal
government unable or unwilling to take the necessary steps as
illustrated above, more and more states are attempting to fill the gap
left by the voluntary-based private sector benefit system under

December 2016.”).
55
See Trent Gillies, Retirement Options Dwindle, and States Steps in. But Should They?,
CNBC (Nov. 8, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/06/retirement-options-dwindle-and-statesstep-in-but-should-they.html [https://perma.cc/4K4R-7975] (Treasury views the myRA program
“not so much as a retirement vehicle, but a way for households to have a little bit of rainy day
funds.”) (quoting Teresa Ghilarducci).
56
See Bob Dannhauser, Pension Fund Governance and Long-Term Investing: Why Old Habits
Die Hard, CFA INSTITUTE BLOG (Mar. 19, 2015), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/
2015/03/19/pension-fund-governance-and-long-term-investing-why-old-habits-die-hard/ [https://
perma.cc/4KMC-9EG4] (“mak[ing] the case for effective governance correlating with effective longhorizon investing”).
57
EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., RIN 1210-AB71, SAVINGS ARRANGEMENTS ESTABLISHED
BY STATES FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.dol.gov/sites/
default/files/ebsa/temporary-postings/savings-arrangements-final-rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/B578
-F6UC].
58
Id. at 1.
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ERISA.59 Legislation for state-based private retirement plans has
already passed in Illinois, Oregon, and Washington State.60 The idea
behind “state payroll deduction saving programs with automatic
enrollment” is to provide employees tax-favored individual IRAs funded
by payroll deductions.61 Under these programs, “employers
are . . . required to remit the payroll deductions to state-administered
IRAs established for the employees.”62 This is still a voluntary program
and payroll deductions may be ceased by employees at any time.63
As alluded to above, there is some concern that these payroll
deduction saving programs would be preempted by ERISA, as state
laws related to employee benefits under § 514 of ERISA.64 The new
EBSA regulations make clear that not only are such state plans not
preempted, but that in the future, similar municipal plans may also not
be preempted.65
Even without ERISA making these state and municipal laws void,
the lack of ERISA protection is still the problem. Just like with models
based on the ACA and myRA, these plans only survive by taking away
the critical ERISA consumer protections to workers to ensure the
protection of their retirement benefits. Without such protections, and
with the brutal history of broken public pension problems in many
states as a guide to how their retirement plans may be treated under
state law in difficult fiscal times,66 one wonders if many employees will
trust their money with such programs.

59

Id. at 2. Although employees who do not have access to employer-sponsored retirement
plans could purchase their own Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), only about ten percent do.
Id.
60
See, e.g., California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE
§§ 100000–100044 (2012); Connecticut Retirement Security Program Act, 2016 Conn. Legis. Serv.
16-29 (West); Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1–95 (2015);
Maryland Small Business Retirement Savings Program Act, Ch. 324 (H.B. 1378) (2016); Oregon
Retirement Savings Board Act, Ch. 557 (H.B. 2960) (2015).
61
EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., supra note 57, at 3.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
29 U.S.C. § 1114.
65
See Hazel Bradford, Municipalities Ready to Join Rush to Private-Sector Plans, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.pionline.com/article/20160905/PRINT/309059983/
municipalities-ready-to-join-rush-to-private-sector-plans [https://perma.cc/2NE2-Z9ZE] (“Pressed
by some cities and retirement advocates to do more, DOL officials also proposed that other
governmental entities be allowed to offer such programs.”).
66
See generally Paul M. Secunda, Litigating for the Future of Public Pensions, 2014 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1353.
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Black Car Fund Model

On a more limited scale, a number of states have worked out
innovative models for independent contractors to still benefit from
protective employment legislation by treating them as “employees” for
purposes of some specific laws. The most prominent example is the
Black Car Fund, which is a workers’ compensation fund created by
statute in New York for taxi drivers.67 Like with ERISA, under New
York and other states’ workers’ compensation law, a worker has to be
an “employee” to be eligible for these benefits.68 Through this legal
fiction, the Black Car Fund statute provides workers’ compensation to
independent contractor taxi drivers, and the Fund itself serves as
employer of record only for the purpose of providing workers’
compensation.69 New York funds this scheme with a 2.5% transaction
fee on every taxi ride.70 Not surprisingly, the idea of “pooling” is at the
center of this scheme: pooling allows for taxi companies to participate
and contribute to the Fund without worrying about worker
classification issues.
One idea, then, would be to treat gig employees at the federal level
as “employees” under ERISA only for purposes of employers making
contributions to retirement plans. Although this type of arrangement
would make an end-around sticky worker-classification issues, many
problems would still remain. For instance, there is no precedent on the
federal level for treating independent contractors as employees for the
purpose of one law, but not for others. Indeed, as discussed below, many
federal employment statutes have rather unhelpful employee
definitions and fall back on the common law control test to determine
employment status.71
Some may say the answer lies in keeping the program at the state
or even municipal level where there is some precedent for treating
independent contractors as employees for very limited purposes.72 Here
the problem is less with a limiting principle and more with the fact that
the Black Car Fund only works because it is limited to one industry
(taxis), for a relatively inexpensive, uncomplicated purpose (workers’
compensation), and through no charge to the employer or employee

67

See History, THE BLACK CAR FUND, http://www.nybcf.org/history [https://perma.cc/S93A-VZ
63]; see also FOSTER ET AL., supra note 15, at 16.
68
See id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See infra Part II.
72
See supra notes 67–70.
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(rather through transaction fees to taxi customers).73 Even if you were
to define the industry as “all gig companies” and provide contributions
by placing a fee on every gig transaction, providing adequate retirement
security is not as simple as providing funding for workers’
compensation.
C.

Private-Sector Solutions

With the federal, state, and municipal government floundering in
their efforts to address the lack of retirement savings for too many
Americans, it is unsurprising that the private-sector has stepped up to
provide programs on its own or in cooperation with gig companies. For
instance, private internet companies, like Peers, Honest Dollar, and
Betterment, are offering to provide retirement benefits, as well as other
benefits and human resource services, to gig companies.74 The
outsourcing of the retirement saving function to these Professional
Employee Organizations (PEOs) is increasingly common as employers
seek to limit their fiduciary liability under ERISA.75
But this current situation in the gig workplace does not mimic the
classic outsourcing fiduciary model. Instead, companies like Uber have
contracted with these private companies to provide access to retirement
benefits to their workers.76 And if such workers are offered retirement
benefits, such benefits are a mere gratuity, something that the
employer has no responsibility for maintaining or administering as a
fiduciary.77 That arrangement would not bode well for gig workers given
that fewer than ten percent of workers without access to a workplace
retirement plan actually contribute to a retirement savings on their

73

See The Black Car Fund, supra note 67.
See Home, PEERS, http://www.peers.org [https://perma.cc/UP9X-MPUB]; Home, HONEST
DOLLAR, https://www.honestdollar.com [https://perma.cc/TR55-LYZX]; Home, BETTERMENT, http://
www.betterment.com [https://perma.cc/L4WT-Q9XQ].
75
Professor Colleen Medill has shown comprehensively how “complete outsourcing,” where an
unrelated third-party is made the “name fiduciary” of a benefit plan, could be considered a settlor
function that is not a fiduciary act and therefore, would relieve plan sponsors of all fiduciary
responsibility. See Colleen Medill, Regulating ERISA Fiduciary Outsourcing, 102 IOWA L. REV.
505, 533–34 (2017). Medill is correct that complete outsourcing should be significantly regulated.
Id. at 546.
76
Lyft offers its drivers a payroll deduction IRA through the financial technology firm, Honest
Dollar. See GALE ET AL., supra note 13, at 10. On the other hand, Uber collaborates with
Betterment for access for workers to an IRA and financial counseling. Id.
77
For an example of this set-up, see Noam Scheiber, Care.com Creates a $500 Limited Benefit
for Gig-Economy Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/busi
ness/carecom-creates-a-500-limited-benefit-for-gig-economy-workers.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
HRB5-GQZW] (finding online marketplace for family caregivers offers $500 a year for workers to
use for health care, transportation, or education expenses).
74
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own78 and that one out of three workers does not have access to a
workplace retirement plan at all.79 Thus, these arrangements between
gig companies and professional service providers are yet another reason
to seek employee status for gig workers under ERISA.
II. GIG WORKERS AS EMPLOYEES
Needless to say, this article would be unnecessary if gig employers
would voluntarily consider their workers as “employees” for ERISA
purposes. Indeed, there are some prominent examples, including the
taxi service Juno, competing against Uber and Lyft, of employers who
are doing just that if workers work for them exclusively (i.e., like normal
full-time employees).80 Juno takes a smaller commission from their
riders, and in addition to benefits like retirement plans, also has set
aside half of the companies’ stock for its drivers.81 Juno focuses on
recruiting Uber and Lyft’s best drivers, those who average more than
4.75 stars on customer feedback.82 So far Juno is operating with 13,000
workers in New York City, but they have big plans to take on Uber and
Lyft more generally.83 Juno appears to recognize the market advantage
in supplying the best gig workers with employee status and employee
benefits. So, there is at least a chance that at some point gig companies
will be forced by market competition to voluntarily recognize employee
status where their competitors do so.
But to be more realistic about the immediate future of worker
classification in the gig marketplace, one must recognize that the gig
business model works by keeping labor costs extremely low and treating
its workers as “commodities” that can be “deactivated” when not acting
in a productive or profitable manner.84 Both Uber and Lyft are fighting
tooth and nail, and not only in the United States, to keep their workers
as independent contractors under the law and so far, no court in the
United States has found these workers to be employees.85

78

Borzi, supra note 32, at 22:33.
Id. at 22:39.
80
See Shahani, supra note 23 (“[Head of Juno] says it’s only fair to offer the option because,
while drivers may set their own hours, the ride-hailing company is the one that exercises control
over the other terms, the rules, the prices.”).
81
Id.
82
See Scheiber, supra note 30 (“Unlike sellers on eBay or Etsy, Uber drivers cannot set the
prices they charge. They are also constrained by the all-important rating system—maintain an
average of around 4.6 out of 5 stars from customers in many cities or risk being deactivated—to
behave a certain way, like not marketing other businesses to passengers.”).
83
See Shahani, supra note 23.
84
Id.
85
See Lobel, supra note 2, at 132–33.
79
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Workers are employees under ERISA based on the control test set
out in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden.86 Darden “defines
an employment relationship as a relationship of control: the employer
plans out tasks, gives orders, and monitors performance.”87
Unfortunately, as other astute commentators have pointed out,
weighing factors such as whether the work is performed at the
company’s premises (hardly ever with gig work) versus whether the
company controls how the work is done and closely supervises the work,
“cloud, rather than illuminate, the central question in such cases:
whether the worker is truly in business for him or herself. Many
employment relationships, after all, are not defined by rigid task
definition and control.”88
At least historically, an employer was only liable for a tort
committed by a worker over whom the employer exercised sufficient
control,89 because “an employer exercising control over its workers
should be responsible to others for its workers’ actions.” The Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) employs one form of the control test to determine
whether employers need to pay employment taxes (federal
unemployment insurance, Social Security, and Medicare taxes) or
withhold federal taxes from its employees’ wages (income, Social
Security, and Medicare).90
As with all balancing tests, the control test has been criticized for
yielding indeterminate, unpredictable results. Quite literally, two
judges could hear the exact same case with the same factors and
reasonably come to diametrically opposed outcomes. Problems in
application include that the factors are unweighted, no single factor is
dispositive, and not all apply in every case.91 Paradoxically, the test has
also come under scrutiny for being a one-size-fits-all test used without
due regard to the many different contexts to which it is applied.92 All
that being said, “regardless of how a particular employment standard
is articulated, no judge will hold a firm liable for employment violations

86

503 U.S. 318 (1992).
See Rogers, supra note 17, at 2.
88
Id. at 3.
89
See Myra H. Barron, Who’s An Independent Contractor? Who’s An Employee?, 14 LAB. LAW.
457, 459 (1999).
90
See JEFFREY M. HIRSCH, PAUL M. SECUNDA & RICHARD A. BALES, UNDERSTANDING
EMPLOYMENT LAW 8 (2d ed. 2013) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1
C.B. 296).
91
Id. at 9.
92
Id.
87
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without first considering the influence (whether exercised or reserved)
that the firm has over working conditions.”93
Darden itself involved the interpretation of Section 3(6) of ERISA,
which circularly defines the term “employee” to “mean[ ] any individual
employed by an employer.”94 The facts of Darden are fairly
straightforward. Darden, a long-time insurance operator for
Nationwide Insurance, was enrolled in the company’s retirement plan.95
He exclusively sold Nationwide insurance policies on commission.96 The
retirement plan had a “bad boy” non-competition clause, which said
Darden would forfeit his retirement benefits if he competed against
Nationwide within a year of leaving and within twenty-five miles of his
previous business location.97 Nationwide terminated Darden and then
Darden began selling competitor insurance policies immediately from
his same office location as an independent insurance agent.98
Nationwide responded by implementing the non-competition clause and
taking away Darden’s already accrued retirement benefits.99 Darden
sued Nationwide under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA100 for violating the
vesting provisions of Section 203(a) of ERISA.101
Noting that ERISA itself did not supply the scope of the meaning
of “employee” under the statute, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in
these circumstances it was necessary to fall back to the established
meaning of that term under the common law agency doctrine.102
Adopting the common law test for employee status under ERISA in
Darden, the Court summarized that test as stated in the Reid case:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s
right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry
are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship
93

Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern
Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1705 (2016).
94
29 U.S.C. § 1002(6).
95
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 319–320 (1992).
96
Id. at 320.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. Generally, such bad-boy clauses are unenforceable under ERISA if applicable vesting
schedules have been met for the retirement plan. See Medill, supra note 38, at 143.
100
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
101
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 320 (1992); 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a).
102
Id. at 322 (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40
(1989)).
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between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the
hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the
method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of
the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the
provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the
hired party.103
The Supreme Court then remanded the case to determine whether
Darden was an employee of Nationwide under this common law test.104
It may at first seem unlikely that a large number of gig employees
would be considered employees under the Darden common law
employee test. However, recent events in both the United States and
the United Kingdom suggest the tide is definitively turning in finding
more of these gig workers to be common law employees. For instance,
in the United Kingdom, two Uber drivers were recently found to be
employees for purposes of British minimum wage laws.105 Similarly, in
the United States, a recent decision from the California Employment
Development Department found an Uber driver to be an employee for
purposes of eligibility under unemployment law.106 As these laws in the
United Kingdom and the United States rely on similar factors as the
control test under ERISA, there is good reason to believe that workers,
especially those that receive a majority or all of their income from gig
companies and work full-time hours, will also be considered employees
and qualify for ERISA protections.
In the meantime, as this article goes to press, class action
employment litigation continues across the country to determine
whether Uber drivers are employees or independent contractors. One
prominent example is O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.107 O’Connor
involves Uber drivers, who believe as common law employees under the
California Labor Code, they are entitled to various labor and

103

Id. at 323–24 (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52 (footnotes omitted)).
Id. at 328.
105
See Toby Meyjes, Uber Drivers Win Battle to Receive National Minimum Wage and
Holiday Pay, METRO UK (Oct. 28, 2016), http://metro.co.uk/2016/10/28/uber-drivers-win-battle-toreceive-national-minimum-wage-and-holiday-pay-6220730/#ixzz4OhHSKSoT [https://perma.cc/P
6E5-722W].
106
See Chris Roberts, Updated: Another Uber Driver Awarded Unemployment Benefits, SF
WEEKLY (Mar. 4, 2016), http://archives.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2016/03/04/uber-driver-awardedunemployment-benefits-first-known-case-in-state [https://perma.cc/LQ5A-YME6].
107
82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (Chen, J.); see also O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No.
13-CV-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016) (denying motion for
preliminary approval of settlement).
104
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employment law protections and benefits, including provisions
involving tips given to employees.108 The O’Connor court, applying a
similar common law control test, denied Uber’s motion for summary
judgment based on its conclusion that, “Plaintiffs are Uber’s
presumptive employees because they ‘perform services’ for the benefit
of Uber,” and that the ultimate question of whether the Uber worker is
an employee or independent contractor is a mixed question of law and
fact and appropriate for juror determination.109
Of course, O’Connor is just the tip of the gig worker
misclassification litigation iceberg. As Orly Lobel has chronicled,
“[r]ecent class action suits brought against [Uber and Lyft] by drivers
claiming misclassification stress the degree of control and direction the
companies exercise.”110 For instance, and as seen in O’Connor,
“plaintiffs claim that, while drivers decide when to turn on the app to
get notifications about ride requests, drivers ‘must respond to
assignments generated by the Uber computer system “within seconds”
or they will lose the job.’”111 Various litigation has also established that
ride-sharing services set pickup times, passenger pay rates, methods of
payment, and which passengers the drivers must pick up.112 To be fair,
there are other common law control factors that do appear to favor the
view that gig workers are independent contractors, including that
drivers use their own car, receive payment per job, and have the ability
to control who to pick up during working hours in certain geographic
areas.113 Yet, at least one prominent judge, Judge Edward Chen of the
Northern District Court of California in San Francisco, has stated, “The
idea that Uber is simply a software platform, I don’t find that a very
persuasive argument.”114
In any case, although this issue is far from being definitively
decided, there is at least a reasonable argument that some gig workers,
including Uber drivers, qualify as employees under the common law
control test of Darden under ERISA. In the next section, this article
assumes for the sake of argument that some gig workers will qualify for

108

O’Connor, 82 F.Supp.3d at 1135 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 351 (requiring employers to pass
on entire amount of tip “paid, given to, or left for an employee by a patron”)).
109
Id.
110
See Lobel, supra note 2, at 133.
111
Id. (quoting Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2014 WL
1338148, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014)).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. (citing Karen Gullo, Uber and Lyft Drivers May Have Employee Status, Judge Says,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-30/uber-driversmay-have-employee-status-judge-says. [https://perma.cc/5SQ6-NCX9]).
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protection under ERISA as common law employees, and asks what the
best mechanism might be for providing such workers with adequate
employer-based retirement benefits.
III. OPEN MEPS: THE BEST WAY TO PROVIDE RETIREMENT BENEFITS
TO GIG EMPLOYEES UNDER ERISA
Having established that current portable benefit proposals lack the
critical recognition of employee status under ERISA and that common
law employee protection under ERISA is probable for at least some
group of gig workers, this Part examines three additional issues: (1) the
advantages of ERISA protections for gig workers, (2) the suitability of
the Open MEP model for gig employee retirement plans, and (3) the
prospects of Open MEPs being legally recognized in the near future
without hindrance by current regulatory impediments.
A.

Fiduciary Protection: The Ultimate Consumer Advantage of
ERISA Protection

To understand the advantages of ERISA to participants and
beneficiaries of employer-sponsored retirement plans, it is necessary to
see what problems employees encountered with their pension plans
prior to ERISA. Chief among these pre-ERISA issues were lack of
transparency, lack of funding, reneging on promised benefits after long
years of service, and financial mismanagement and fraud.115 In
response, ERISA provides reporting and disclosure provisions, vesting
and minimum funding standards, and fiduciary protections, all of which
can be enforced through a private right of action by participants and
beneficiaries.116
For instance, ERISA’s reporting and disclosure requirements
include that not only basic benefit plan information be filed annually
with the DOL on 5500 Forms,117 but that each plan issue a summary
plan description and a summary of material modifications in language
and in a form that an average lay person can comprehend.118 Because
of these requirements, participants know and can enforce their rights
under a plan, can make informed decisions concerning plan benefits,
assist government agencies in ERISA enforcement, and promote
compliance by plan sponsors (employers) and other plan fiduciaries.119
115
116
117
118
119

Medill, supra note 38, at 11–15.
Id.
Id. at 71–72 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1023).
29 U.S.C. § 1022(a); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-1.
See Medill, supra note 38, at 66–68.
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Although all the protective provisions of ERISA described above
play an important role, the heart of ERISA is the fact that plan assets
are held in trust and those that discretionarily operate, manage, or
administer are fiduciaries and/or trustees of the plan.120 Such fiduciary
status means that plan fiduciaries must put their own self-interest
aside and act for the sole interest of plan participants and
beneficiaries.121 More specifically, ERISA lays out four general fiduciary
duties and a litany of prohibited practices that parties-in-interest and
fiduciaries may not transact with regard to plan assets.122 The four
general fiduciary duties include: (1) the duty of loyalty to act exclusively
with the purpose to provide benefits to plan participants and
beneficiaries; (2) the duty of care/prudence to act with the prudence that
an objectively prudent fiduciary would in similar circumstances; (3)
with regard to specified pension plans, to prudently diversify the Plan’s
assets; and (4) the duty to follow the terms of the plans unless they
conflict with the provisions of ERISA.123 In short, ERISA fiduciaries are
like other trustees, who as Justice Cardozo famously commented: “[are]
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior . . . the level of conduct for fiduciaries [has]
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.”124
If one is a fiduciary and abuses one of the fiduciary duties or
engages in a prohibited transaction to which no exemption applies, the
fiduciary can be sued by the DOL, participants, beneficiaries, or other
fiduciaries for breach of fiduciary duties.125 Equitable damages include
making the plan whole for any losses, disgorgement of profits, removal
of the fiduciary, surcharge, equitable estoppel, reformation, restitution,
injunction, or mandamus.126 In short, ERISA fiduciaries are subject to
significant legal responsibilities and significant liability if they do not
act with the necessary loyalty and prudence in carrying out their
responsibilities to plan participants and beneficiaries. Fiduciary
protection for retirement plan participants under ERISA is the gold
standard.
120

29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (“[A]ll assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one
or more trustees.”).
121
Id. § 1104(a).
122
Id. §§ 1104–1108.
123
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(D).
124
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
125
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), (3), (5).
126
See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011); Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
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The Open MEP Model under ERISA

In order to take maximum advantage of both the consumer
protections of ERISA and the flexibility in plan structures that ERISA
permits, gig companies should adopt some form of Open MEP model for
their employees.127 Essentially, the Open MEP model allows separate,
independent, gig companies to mostly outsource the retirement benefit
function to an entity that specializes in the provision of these benefits,
with the fiduciary, disclosure, and other consumer protections of ERISA
thrown into the bargain.128 By keeping these platform-based open
MEPs under ERISA, the current trend of gig companies to privately
contract retirement plan provisions to online service providers can be
avoided.129 Unlike current arrangements with companies such as
Betterment, Honest Dollar, and Peers, these MEPs will operate under
fiduciary rules that require the MEP to act in the best interest of
employee participants, with the duty of loyalty and care expected of
such a provider under similar circumstances.130 Providers not living up
to these exacting standards could be sued by the DOL, other plan
fiduciaries, or participants or beneficiaries of the plan, just like any
other breaching fiduciary under ERISA.131 This aspect of the open MEP
is perhaps the most crucial advantage of providing a mechanism for
permitting gig companies to provide retirement benefits through the
financial intermediation of an open MEP trustee to lessen the financial
and regulatory burden of providing such benefits.132
There are a number of advantages to the Open MEP model for both
gig employers and employees. From an employee perspective, perhaps
one of the biggest problems that these employees face is the lack of
access to retirement benefits.133 If one’s employer does not offer

127

29 U.S.C. § 1060(a) (provisions on multiple employer plans and other special rules). Open
MEPs, including their advantages and disadvantages, are discussed in comprehensive detail in
Advisory Opinion 2012-04A. See EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., ADVISORY OPINION LETTER
2012-04(A) 1 (2012), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance
/advisory-opinions/AO2012-04A_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB7X-4NGR]. The EBSA found that
this arrangement was not an “employee pension plan” because no “employer” maintained or
established the plan as required under Section 3(5) of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5).
128
See OUTSOURCING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN SERVICES, supra note 20, at 6–8.
129
See supra Part I.C.
130
See OUTSOURCING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN SERVICES, supra note 20, at 8–12.
131
Id. at 9.
132
Id. at 6 (“Fiduciary risk may be further limited to the extent that the third party provides
improved plan administration, management, and compliance processes.”).
133
See Nevin E. Adams, Big Apple Unveils MEP, Retirement Program for Private Sector
Workers, NAPA.NET (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.napa-net.org/news/technical-competence/stateauto-ira-plans/big-apple-unveils-mep-retirement-program-for-private-sector-workers [https://per
ma.cc/GR67-NC4N].
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employee benefits (which they are legally able to do because employee
benefit sponsorship in the United States is voluntary),134 then
employees may be able to take advantage of one of the new state-based
automatic IRA programs135 or seek to save through private IRAs. Either
way, such employees have historically been shown either to save very
little or nothing at all for retirement.136
The solution for gig workers who are deemed “employees” under
the ERISA Darden control test is to have their employers establish a
gig worker open MEP. This model allows both employers and employees
to pool their retirement contributions, like the Black Car Fund does,
and get the best investment options at the lowest prices.137 The
advantages for gig employers are the tax deduction that comes with
such retirement contributions,138 the competitive advantage in
obtaining better workers by offering a better benefit package (see the
Juno example in Part II),139 and the ability to off-load most of their
fiduciary liability in co-sponsoring such a plan.140
The advantage to employees is the ability to not even have to think
about retirement savings and automatically let it happen. By setting up
an Open MEP with automatic enrollment and automatic escalation
features with a wide variety of gig employers participating, not only
would gig employees be able to take advantage of tax-exempt
retirement savings, but they would also be enrolled and have a portion
of their salary contributed to their individual MEP account without
becoming bogged down in complex retirement decisions and
procrastinating over various and complex investment options.141
Because of their significant purchasing power and economies of scale,

134

See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010) (“ERISA represents a ‘careful
balancing’ between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the
encouragement of the creation of such plans.” (quoting Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200,
215 (2004))).
135
See Andrew Remo, DOL’s Proposed Safe Harbor for State Savings Programs: A Closer Look,
NAPA.NET (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.napa-net.org/news/technical-competence/state-auto-iraplans/dols-proposed-safe-harbor-for-state-savings-programs-a-closer-look/ [https://perma.cc/FZE6
-EKRT].
136
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
137
See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (on Black Car Fund pooling structure); see
also GALE ET AL., supra note 13, at 12 (“MEPs have lower administrative costs and a simpler
regulatory structure than a 401(k), and could be offered to independent workers as well as
traditional employees if Congress and regulators approve.”).
138
See GALE ET AL., supra note 13, at 15 (“Research that focuses on low-income households,
however, generally finds larger impacts of [tax] saving incentives on net saving.”).
139
See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (discussing Juno approach to gig workers).
140
See OUTSOURCING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN SERVICES, supra note 20, at 6.
141
See Secunda, supra note 26, at 524–25 (discussing procrastination and inertia associated
with many individuals when it comes to complex financial decisions involving retirement saving).
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these Open MEPs would have access to lowest-price wholesale mutual
funds and other investments so that gig employees would default into a
highly-diversified, low-fee pension account.142 If gig employees wanted
more control or had more financial savvy, they could easily opt-out and
place their retirement money in whatever proportion in whatever funds
the open MEP offers.
C.

The Future Viability of the Open MEP Model for Gig Employee
Retirement Plans

The good news is that Open MEPs are gaining increasing traction
both in federal administrative guidance and in Congress. As far as
administrative guidance, a recent DOL Interpretive Bulletin would
allow states and cities to set up an automatic enrollment of participants
into an IRA-based state program employing a MEP approach.143 Under
such arrangements, “participating employers would be required to
execute a participation agreement and would have limited fiduciary
responsibilities (like prudently selecting the arrangement and a duty to
monitor its operation).”144 The bad news here, at least for the proposal
set forth in this article, is that it specifically declines to extend the Open
MEP model to private sector-employers.145 The reason that the DOL is
not currently permitting Open MEPs under ERISA “is because ‘the
state has a unique representational interest in the health and welfare
of its citizens.’”146
On the legislative side of the ledger, Senator Orrin Hatch has
introduced the Retirement Enhancement and Savings Act of 2016,147
which would permit open MEPs for private sector employees and allow
multiple employers to pool retirement funds into a single 401(k)
retirement plan starting in 2020.148 Under current law, independent

142

Such a system would look and work much like the Australian superannuation (Super)
guarantee retirement scheme. See id. at 545 (“[W]ith Super funds having so much money in their
control, not only could the best money managers be hired, but the investment funds’ fees would
likely be lowered.”).
143
See Remo, supra note 135 (“While to date no states have passed legislation creating such
an arrangement, under the DOL’s guidance the state itself would be the plan sponsor, the named
fiduciary and the plan administrator (but could also delegate those responsibilities to third
parties.”)).
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIRMAN’S
MODIFICATION OF THE “RETIREMENT ENHANCEMENT AND SAVINGS ACT OF 2016” 3–14 (Sept. 21,
2016), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4959 [https://perma.cc/T5KX-J
G7A].
148
See Precious Abraham & Ann Marie Breheny, Senate Committee Gives Retirement Savings
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employers who wish to pool funds for retirement plan purposes must
demonstrate a “common interest.”149 Moreover, another difficulty under
current law is the so-called “one-bad-apple rule,” which disqualifies the
entire MEP from favorable tax treatment if one employer does not meet
the applicable tax rules.150
Senator Hatch’s Open MEP proposal would remove the “common
interest” requirement and the “one-bad-apple rule.”151 In the recent
past, this model has had wide bipartisan support, with President
Obama including an open MEP proposal in his budget for fiscal year
2017.152 Hatch’s Open MEP law passed the Senate Finance Committee
on a 26-0 vote in the fall of 2016 with the following language: “two or
more unrelated private employers [would be allowed] to adopt a defined
contribution pooled employer plan (PEP) as long as the PEP has a
pooled plan provider (PPP) as the named fiduciary to the plan.”153
There are a number of advantages for this PEP/PPP model. First,
it outsources the myriad fiduciary duties to the PPP.154 These onerous
fiduciary requirements include: qualifying the plan for tax-favored
status under the Internal Revenue Code’s non-discrimination rules,
operating and managing the plan on a day-to-day basis, and engaging
in investment selection (perhaps through retention of a third-party
investment advisor).155 The only fiduciary duty that members of the
PEP would retain would be to prudently select, and then monitor, the
PPP, thus limiting their exposure to potential fiduciary liability.156

Bill Unanimous Backing, TOWERS WATSON (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.towerswatson.com/enUS/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/insider/2016/10/senate-committee-gives-retirement-savings-bi
ll-unanimous-backing [https://perma.cc/T5GT-622V] (“The Retirement Enhancement and Savings
Act would authorize open MEPs beginning in 2020.”).
149
See Sean Forbes, Expanding Multiple Employer Plans Seen Boosting Retirement Savings,
BLOOMBERG BNA PENSION AND BENEFITS DAILY REPORTER (June 22, 2016), http://www.bna.com/
expanding-multiple-employer-n57982074525/ [https://perma.cc/QEA3-ZU55] (“Under current law,
employers must have a common nexus—such as being in the same industry—to be in a MEP.”).
150
See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.413-2(a)(3)(iv) (as amended in 1979) and 1.416-1, Q&A (G-1) (1984).
151
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 147, at 9.
152
See Nevin Adams, Obama Administration Wants to Open Door for Open MEPs, ASPPA.NET
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.asppa.org/News/Article/ArticleID/5813 [https://perma.cc/W88K-69
BN].
153
See Andrew Remo, MEPs Resurface as ‘PEPs’ as Senate Finance Approves New Retirement
Bill, NAPE.NET (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.napa-net.org/news/technical-competence/legislation/
meps-resurface-as-peps-as-senate-finance-approves-new-retirement-bill/ [https://perma.cc/28JMHA2M].
154
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 147, at 10.
155
See Remo, supra note 153.
156
See supra note 73 (discussing fact that residual fiduciary exists for plan sponsor, and not
possible to engage in “extreme outsourcing” and delegating all ERISA fiduciary duty from the plan
sponsor); cf. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828–29 (2015) (holding that plan sponsors of
401(k) plan still have fiduciary duty in selecting and monitoring participant investment options).
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Additionally, the price tag of permitting the formation of these
organizations is relatively low: $3.2 billion over ten years from loss of
tax revenue from the additional tax deduction for employers and taxexempt status for employee contributions.157
Unfortunately, Hatch’s bill was not enacted in 2016,158 yet it is not
too far-fetched, given current legislative and regulatory developments
that the Open MEP bill will be reintroduced during the coming Trump
presidency and will soon be available for multiple employers in the
private sector without the common interest and one-bad-apple
requirement.159 There is also a wide-range of interest groups who
support the idea of Open MEPs.160 As Senator Elizabeth Warren
perceptively recognized during hearings on Hatch’s bill, this new
approach is well-suited for gig employees.161 The bill would allow
various gig companies to pool their contributions to a common 401(k)
retirement plan, with all the advantages that come with belonging to a
large fund.162 Most importantly, such funds would have the advantages
of providing participating employees diversification, low costs,
reporting and disclosure requirements, and fiduciary protections based
on the trust-based status of such 401(k) plans.163
CONCLUSION
The rise of the gig economy with its part-time, itinerant,
independent workers, in conjunction with the employee-centric nature
of occupational retirement benefits under ERISA, has led to gig
employees largely lacking meaningful retirement benefits. Current
proposals to provide portable benefits to gig workers as independent
workers or independent contractors are unacceptable because such
benefits would not be secured by the fiduciary consumer protections of
ERISA.

157

See Remo, supra note 153.
See John Iekel, 2017: MEPs, State Plans, Education Loom Large. ASPPA.Net (Jan. 4, 2017),
http://www.asppa-net.org/News/Article/ArticleID/7122 [https://perma.cc/4Z42-S96W].
159
See Rob Massa, Trump’s Pension Policy, CFO.COM (Dec. 9, 2016), http://ww2.cfo.com/re
tirement-plans/2016/12/trumps-pension-plan [https://perma.cc/3EGN-DMNC].
160
See Sean Forbes, State Open MEPs Ready to Bloom, But with Challenges, BNA BLOOMBERG
PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.bna.com/state-open-meps-n57982063895/
[https://perma.cc/4CCD-A9J9].
161
See id. (“Proposals should address all kinds of workers, including not only full-time
employees at small businesses, but also part-time workers, individuals in the gig economy and
independent contractors, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) said at the hearing.”).
162
See Massa, supra note 159.
163
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 147, at 10.
158
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However, two developments with regard to the retirement security
of the gig workers are promising. First, there are now increasing
examples of gig workers being found to be common law employees under
tests like ERISA’s Darden test. As common law employees, gig workers
are entitled to the reporting and disclosure, vesting, funding, and
fiduciary protections of ERISA. Second, the use of an Open MEP model,
in which PEPs have a PPP as the named fiduciary, are gaining bipartisan acceptance. This article encourages Congress to promptly
adopt the open MEP model, free of current regulatory restrictions, so
that gig employees can enjoy retirement security with the peace of mind
that ERISA fiduciary protections provide under industry-wide gig
employee Open MEPs.

